Bergman 2006 - Adjecent internationalism, Studia, Skandynawistyka

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Adjacent Internationalism
The Concept of Solidarity and Post-Cold
War Nordic–Baltic Relations
ANNIKA BERGMAN
ABSTRACT
The Nordic states have long been known for their commitment to a dis-
tinctly social-democratic set of internationalist values, and the demise
of communism in the Nordic states’ adjacent region provided an excel-
lent opportunity to seek new forms of cooperation with their Baltic
neighbours informed by the tradition of Nordic internationalism.
Nordic internationalism has thus recently acquired a visible Baltic
dimension, which is here defined as ‘adjacent internationalism’. The
purpose of this article is to analyse this new branch of Nordic foreign
policy against the backdrop of Nordic internationalism more generally
through an examination of the Nordic states’ joint efforts to prepare
the Baltic States for European Union (EU) membership. The main
argument developed here is that adjacent internationalism has not only
concretely facilitated Baltic EU membership, but has also given rise to
an emergent Nordic–Baltic sphere of community. In so doing, it has
contributed to the re-invigoration of the normative dimensions of inter-
Nordic cooperation as well as Nordic internationalism more generally.
In examining this issue, the article explores the key premises of Nordic
international relations and offers a normatively informed reading of
relations between states in a dynamic regional environment.
Keywords
: adjacent internationalism; internationalism; multilateral
integration assistance; Nordic–Baltic sphere of community; solidarity
Introduction
Over the years, the Nordic states (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden)
have gained a reputation for being respectable members of the interna-
tional community. While supporting international order and institutions, the
Nordics have gone further than most states by giving real substance to sol-
idarism in global politics. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the Nordics had
demonstrated their commitment to promoting internationalist values such
as collective security, solidarity, peace and redistributive justice beyond
borders. During that period the focal points of Nordic internationalism
were mainly the developing world and the United Nations.
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol. 41(1): 73–97. Copyright ©2006 NISA www.ps.au.dk/NISA
Sage Publications www.sagepublications.com
0010-8367. DOI: 10.1177/0010836706060936
 74
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
41(1)
As a result of the break-up of the USSR in 1991, the Nordic states were
also given a unique opportunity to engage more actively in their adjacent
region. This change led to greater dialogue and cooperation between the
Nordic and Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). The Nordics
demonstrated extensive willingness to support the democratic, economic
and social development of the three Baltics. Initially, this assistance dif-
fered little from traditional forms of Nordic overseas development assis-
tance (ODA) and was primarily aimed at supporting the early
democratization process of the Baltic states. From the mid-1990s onwards,
however, the Nordic states focused their efforts on assisting the Baltic
states in their road to European Union (EU) membership as well as lend-
ing support to the build-up of their national defence structures and, by
extension, their pursuit of NATO membership. In this way they hoped to
contribute to the solidification of Baltic independence and re-entry into
the international community. As a consequence, Nordic internationalism
has now acquired a new Baltic dimension, which is here defined as adja-
cent internationalism. The key objective of this article is to examine and
evaluate this new branch of Nordic foreign policy against the backdrop of
Nordic internationalism more generally. It contends that the long-standing
Nordic tradition of solidarity with small and vulnerable nations in the
international system can be traced through to their post-Cold War rela-
tions with the Baltic states (Archer, 1999; Bergman, 2002). Thus, by tracing
the distinctive norms and values underpinning Nordic foreign policy more
generally we can also further our understanding of their involvement in
the Baltics. A key argument here is that Baltic independence has given
Nordic internationalism and cooperation an ethical purpose and sense of
direction in the post-Cold War era, despite exogenous and endogenous
pressures for normalization of Nordic foreign policy. More importantly, the
emergence of a distinctive Nordic–Baltic sphere of community provides a
normative case for the creation of new and more inclusive forms of politi-
cal community in Europe and elsewhere embracing both policy elites and
civil society (Linklater, 1998).
The article starts by providing a brief general overview of international-
ism, exploring its different forms as well as arguing that rather than defin-
ing the Nordic states as prototypical liberal internationalists it is more
appropriate to define them in social democratic terms. Central to this argu-
ment is the contention that international solidarity has remained a key fea-
ture in the foreign policies of the Nordic states since the 1960s, although
there are variations in their internationalist behaviour. The article goes on
to examine the core elements of Nordic internationalism, in particular by
focusing on ODA. It then provides a definition of adjacent internationalism
by arguing that it is a distinctive Nordic–Baltic project, which is norma-
tively driven and can be traced back to embedded patterns of Nordic coop-
eration as well as solidarism at the global level. As such, it distinguishes
itself from the wider process of Baltic Sea regionalism, which has a less
pronounced normative content. To substantiate these claims the article
points to the Nordics’ collective efforts to secure Baltic membership of the
EU. This area has been selected because it has not only contributed to
BERGMAN
:
ADJACENT INTERNATIONALISM
75
Baltic EU membership and the emergence of a Nordic–Baltic sphere of
community, but it is also a manifestation of the Nordic states’ joint efforts
to internationalize their foreign policy values and promote small states sol-
idarism at the regional level. It will also be argued that adjacent interna-
tionalism and Nordic enlargement policy are co-constitutive processes.
The final part of the article discusses the wider implications of adjacent
internationalism in the post-Cold War era given the growing pressures on
the Nordic internationalist mindset from globalization, neo-liberal eco-
nomic policies, growing intolerance towards immigrants, as well as
Denmark’s participation in the 2003 US-led intervention in Iraq (Bergman,
2002; Lawler, 2003). Nonetheless, it is concluded that there remains enough
common ground in the Nordic states’ foreign policies for it to be meaning-
ful still to speak of a distinctive Nordic internationalist tradition. Indeed,
the weight of evidence provided by the close analysis of the normative
dimensions of Nordic–Baltic relations in the post-Cold War era suggests
that Nordic internationalism has considerable life in it yet.
Internationalism and Solidarity in Nordic Foreign Policy
While the starting point of most accounts of Western internationalism is lib-
eralism, there are variations in states’ internationalist behaviour and poli-
cies. Halliday (1988: 188) distinguishes between liberal, hegemonic and
revolutionary forms of internationalism, all of which appeal to the idea that
‘… we both are and should be part of a broader community than that of the
nation or the state’. Classical liberal theorists such as Adam Smith stressed
the importance of global trade and commerce in overcoming the ever pre-
sent tension between states in the international system. Kant went further by
arguing that there is a global harmony of interests binding all people
together and that this can best be realized through the application of reason,
republican and responsible government, the rule of law applied globally, as
well as a federation of states. These ideas were embraced by liberal interna-
tionalists of the twentieth century who stressed the need for domestic
change to prevent callous national interests from dominating foreign policy
choices, binding international law and mediating processes to facilitate com-
munications and negotiations of disputes in global politics. Woodrow Wilson,
for example, believed that these ideas were central to the construction of a
Kantian form of ‘federative peace organisation’ (Franceschet, 2001: 213).
Echoing this, Goldmann (1994: 2) defines internationalism as ‘a set of beliefs
to the effect that if there is more law, organisation, exchange, and communi-
cation among states, this will reinforce peace and security’. On this basis, the
Nordics can reasonably lay claim to having an overt and consistent interna-
tionalist content to their foreign policies and constitute good examples of
states that practice ‘accommodative internationalism’ in that they tend to
‘empathize’ with other actors in the international system (Goldmann, 1994:
23). As such, they have sought to increase the affinities between people of
different nations as well as ‘reducing the incompatibilities of interest
between them’ and evinced a substantially stronger commitment to the
76
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
41(1)
value of international solidarity as opposed to mere international relations
(Goldmann, 1994: 23). ‘Coercive’ internationalists, such as the USA, on the
other hand, favour coercive and ‘ostracizing’ measures in bringing stability
to international politics (Goldmann, 1994: 189).
Nordic internationalists have, thus, generally shared the broad liberal
vision of the importance of free trade as well as international cooperation,
while arguing that these alone are inadequate means for promoting global
peace. Rather, they have subscribed to a social democratic conception of
global obligation across borders, which entails placing greater emphasis
upon global social and economic justice, particularly the reduction of
uneven development. This tendency is clearly illustrated by the close con-
nection between the Nordic states’ practice of
universal
welfare at the
domestic level and their consistently generous provisions of ODA. The
Anglo-Saxon liberal welfare model is based on the principle of means test-
ing and ‘modest universal rights’, while the ‘Middle European systems’ are
based upon a ‘relative low commitment to social services, based upon social
insurance contributions’ (Giddens, 1998: 7). The contention developed here
is that states that do not practise universal welfare at the domestic level are
less likely to do so at the international level, a glaring example being the
USA, a state that only provides a minimal level of social welfare to its own
citizens and whose ODA provisions only amounted to 0.15% of GNI in
2003, a figure that is well below the OECD average and barely more than
one-fifth of the Nordic states’ national contributions, a point returned to
below (OECD, 2004). The Nordic Social Democratic welfare states, how-
ever, have provided particularly appropriate local settings for the social
incubation of the value of solidarity, the influence of which, moreover, has
not been confined to the domestic policy arena, but can be traced through
to their foreign and security policies (Palme, 1968: 179; Lawler, 1993, 1997,
2003: 157). As Joenniemi (1997: 212) rightly notes, ‘the word solidarity has
had a real meaning in Norden, providing leeway for a generative grammar
that goes beyond the dictates of states sovereignty’. Solidarity is also closely
connected with social democratic ideology. Indeed, for Olof Palme (1972: 1)
‘Social Democracy means solidarity’ and in Sweden, perhaps more than
anywhere else, internationalism and solidarity have ‘acquired a status of
national ideology’, influencing the manner in which the country conceives
its duty across borders (Trädgårdh, 2002: 152). Given this, it is more insight-
ful to understand Nordic international behaviour as a distinctly social
democratic variety of internationalism rather than as prototypical liberal
internationalism. Distinctively social democratic norms and values are cen-
tral to the Nordics’ consistent and robust support for national, regional and
international commitments to solidarity, universal welfare policies, justice
and equality (Lawler, 1997; Bergman, 2002). There are, of course, national
variations in the foreign policies of the Nordic states, as their differing
standpoints towards membership of the EU and NATO illustrate.
Moreover, the Nordic states have not been unaffected by the processes of
Europeanization, globalization and neo-liberal economic policies, which
have seriously challenged the future of the Nordic welfare model (Mahon,
2000; Patomäki, 2002).
BERGMAN
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ADJACENT INTERNATIONALISM
77
The four countries continue, nonetheless, to subscribe to the idea ‘that
affluent societies have moral obligations to assist the populations of the
poorer states’ (Linklater, 1998: 208) coupled with their ongoing support for
the UN, international law, conflict mediation and resolution, as well as the
dispersion of democratic principles across the globe. Their Social
Democratic heritage seems key here. This view is supported by Lawler
(1993: 29), who argues that it is precisely because of the social embedding
of key values ‘that overtly social democratic states are less likely to aban-
don their global welfare commitments in the face of cyclical pressures’.
There are those who question the ethical underpinnings of such activism.
Dahl (1999), for example, mockingly defines Sweden as a ‘moral super-
power’, pointing to its Cold War tendency to support leftist regimes or lib-
eration movements while neglecting other parts of the world. But, such
lines of criticism only serve to underpin the point being made here. To ques-
tion the specific ethical motives behind a state’s aid policy is one thing, to
disregard its ethical underpinnings in their entirety is a different matter
(Lawler, 2003: 159; Hattori, 2003: 231). What is clear is that generous provi-
sions of ODA remain central to Nordic internationalism despite the chang-
ing electoral fortunes of the Nordic Social Democratic parties. The fact that
Nordic ODA disbursements do not usually fluctuate significantly with
changes in the political colouring of governments suggests that social
democratic ideas about international development are sufficiently embed-
ded to resist significant change. Norway, Sweden and Denmark remain
three of the five most generous OECD states with regard to ODA (the
fourth and fifth being The Netherlands and Luxembourg) a position they
have held within the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
for a number of years. These states are also the only ones to have achieved
the UN recommended target of 0.7% of their GNI as ODA (OECD, 2004).
Despite its failure to match the generosity of the other Nordic states,
Finland provided more ODA than larger states such as Germany in 2003.
1
Historically, Finland has a weaker social democratic tradition than the
other Nordic states; however, it too exhibits a pronounced internationalist
content to its foreign policy, with leading Social Democratic ministers fre-
quently speaking out against structural inequalities in the international sys-
tem. The Social Democratic Foreign Minister has been at the forefront of
this debate highlighting the negative implications of globalization for the
world’s poor (Tuomioja, 2004: 2).
2
In line with this broad way of thinking,
the Finnish government has committed itself to reaching the UN recom-
mended target for ODA of 0.7% by 2010 (Finnish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2003: 2). Whether this target will be met is hard to predict; however,
an initial examination of the general direction in Finnish foreign policy sug-
gests that there is a real wish to do so.
Adjacent Internationalism
There is a relatively wide range of literature debating the internationalist
tradition in the Nordic states’ foreign policies (Dolman, 1979; Pratt, 1989,
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